Classics and the Western Canon discussion

We are now getting into the stronger medicine that Philosophy promised. Do you find Philosophy's arguments against the sources of happiness that mankind seeks to be persuasive?

We also seem to me here to get more clearly into the Christian realm, which a god who is clearly the Christian all good all powerful god, and not the pagan gods who were neither. Does this mean that this argument would not make sense to a non-Christian? Or is there a foundation for this in the Platonic forms?

Near the end of this book I seemed to sense that we were entering more fully than I have seen before into a Platonic dialogue form with Philosophy leading Boethius by a series of questions to follow exactly where she wanted him to go. Did anybody else get this sense also?

Parts 1 through 8 are fairly straight-forward, and they do seem to proceed in very Socratic, reductionist sort of way, eliminating wealth, position, power, fame, and pleasure as the highest forms of happiness.

But Parts 9 through 12 are more difficult. His conclusion is very Platonic -- that goodness is a unity in which the soul partakes and which the soul desires -- but I think I'm going to have to map out his argument to see how he gets there. It's a bit of a thicket. Anyone have any thoughts on this yet?

Patrice wrote: "Still haven't finished this book but it's exciting. This is the pay-off.

Now I see why Philosophy reminded me of Diotoma. That seems to be who she is and while I could not understand exactly wha..."

It will be interesting to compare them both when we discuss our next reading choice.

Here is how Book 3 shakes out, roughly, I think:

Parts 1 through 8: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing to be desired. It is a state both perfect and perfectly self-sufficient. Philosophy then examines the things that people pursue in the mistaken belief that they are good and sufficient in themselves: wealth, honor/respect, power, fame and bodily pleasure, and he shows that none of them are by themselves perfectly sufficient.

Part 9: The reason why these things are not sufficient is that they have been "subdivided and removed by men from the state of perfection and truth to a state of falseness and imperfection." He goes on to say that power, honor, happiness, and sufficiency are in their perfection all aspects of the same thing. They "differ in name but not in substance."

Part 10: So what is this one perfect thing? Because we recognize imperfection, that must mean that there is an ultimate Perfection. (How would we recognize imperfection if there were no perfection to compare it to? St. Anselm uses this argument in his "ontological proof" for the existence of God.) The Supreme Perfection is God, who is also perfect happiness, and the perfect good. So true happiness is to be found in God, who is the essence of happiness.

The natural world issues from perfection but degenerates into "this fallen and worn out condition." All the same, in our imperfection we still seek the perfect good -- God -- and in so doing we participate in God's divinity and happiness.

Book 11: The reason why the things people pursue are not perfect and good is because they are different from each other. If you seek power, but don't have the respect of the people, the people may conspire against you. Any one thing without the others is lacking. Only in unity, as the perfect Good that encompasses everything good, does it become a worthwhile pursuit. Goodness conveys a balance and order to the individual good things in such a way that the whole is self-sufficient and lacking in nothing. All things in nature seek out this goodness as their natural end and purpose. (This sounds very Aristotelian.)

Book 12: And so the way the world is governed, the thing Boethius has forgotten, is revealed. The unity and order of God (the Perfect Self-Sufficient Good) to which all nature tends is true happiness. If people willingly acquiesce to the regulation of God, loving the perfect good, they will attain happiness.

It is important to note that this God is not a personal God, but a prime mover who governs the world without being affected by anything in it. It is the Supreme and Perfect Good.

That is the broad outline of the argument, at least as I see it so far. Improvements are obviously needed, and welcome. :)

Thomas wrote: "Here is how Book 3 shakes out, roughly, I think:

Parts 1 through 8: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing to be desired. It is a state both perfect and perfectly self-sufficient. ..."

Really nice summary, Thomas. I'll be looking through it more carefully, but on first read I can't see any needed improvements.

One question: do you see a difference between the prose and poetic sections, is one type doing one thing and the other doing another thing, or do you see them working in unison without any difference of content or kind?

Everyman wrote: Does this mean that this argument would not make sense to a non-Christian? Or is there a foundation for this in the Platonic forms?

In a Pre-Christian world I certainty think that there might be some difficultly in understanding the argument put forth, as the concept of the idea that true happiness is to be obtained in the seeking of this Perfect God would be a very new idea, and one which may not be comprehensible.

Though the ideas proposed in regards to the unity need for finding the unity and that perfection comes when all things become one with each other or one with God, does seem to have some commonality with certain elements of Eastern thought.

In a world that has already been exposed to Christian thought, I think the Non-Christian on an intellectual level would be able to make sense of the arguments presented by Philosophy, but I the lessons at this point which Philosophy imparts to Boethius would become inaccessible to the Non-Christian, because they revolve around the necessity of accepting a Supreme and Perfect God.

Patrice wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Here is how Book 3 shakes out, roughly, I think:

Parts 1 through 8: Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing to be desired. It is a state both perfect and perfectly se..."

I might have missed something. Did Boethius ever explicitly equate the ultimate Good to God? Although Plato hinted at it in the Symposium and other works, he never explicitly draw the conclusion that would follow from his arguments, as far as I remember. If he had, he would have been persecuted by the polytheistic Greeks for impiety. Hence the "unwritten doctrine". :)

Nemo wrote: I might have missed something. Did Boethius ever explicitly equate the ultimate Good to God? ..."

For since nothing can be imagined better than God, how can we doubt Him to be good than whom there is nothing better? Now, reason shows God to be good in such wise as to prove that in Him is perfect good. For were it not so, He would not be supreme of all things; for there would be something else more excellent, possessed of perfect good, which would seem to have the advantage in priority and dignity, since it has clearly appeared that all perfect things are prior to those less complete. Wherefore, lest we fall into an infinite regression, we must acknowledge the supreme God to be full of supreme and perfect good. But we have determined that true happiness is the perfect good; therefore true happiness must dwell in the supreme Deity.'

Silver wrote: "Nemo wrote: I might have missed something. Did Boethius ever explicitly equate the ultimate Good to God? ..."

For since nothing can be imagined better than God, how can we doubt Him to be good t..."

Ah, thanks! Great quote. :)

Boethius was more direct than Plato perhaps because he had no fear of persecution for his belief in 6th century Rome. He was also influenced by St. Augustine, who had used this exact argument in his treatises. I don't know whether St. Anselm, as Thomas mentioned, was influenced by these who had preceded him. They could have all received divine revelation independently, for that matter. :)

Silver wrote: "Everyman wrote: Does this mean that this argument would not make sense to a non-Christian? Or is there a foundation for this in the Platonic forms?

In a Pre-Christian world I certainty think th..."

I see this as a Theist, not necessarily a Christian, argument, since it can be used for any Supreme Being (or Beings). For instance, Einstein was not a Christian, but he believed the world was governed by a supreme Intelligence, not a personal God. He couldn't accept the probabilistic world view of quantum mechanics, because "God doesn't play dice".

Patrice wrote: "I keep thinking of Einstein's quote. I even bought the Teaching Company's course on Quantum physics because I really don't know a thing about it. I'm not at all sure what Einstein meant. Religio..."

I tend to think that the best way to know what someone believes is to read his own works. I'd highly recommend Einstein's Ideas and Opinions, and, if you want to get a complete picture, Einstein: His life and universe.

Everyman wrote: "One question: do you see a difference between the prose and poetic sections, is one type doing one thing and the other doing another thing, or do you see them working in unison without any difference of content or kind? "

They seem to work in tandem, though the poem doesn't necessarily reiterate the prose argument. The prose works dialectically, while the poem expresses a more nuanced version of the same theme. In some cases the poem puts the prose argument of that part into the context of the whole. Having both literary forms creates an interesting interplay, almost like a dialogue in itself.

Patrice wrote: "Thanks so much Nemo! I didn't know where to look."

I should add that the book titled "The World as I See It" is an abridged version of "Ideas and Opinions".

Just to give you a flavor of what to expect, here is an Einstein's quote:

“Never yet have I experienced from the fair sex such energetic rejection of all advances; or, if I have, never from so many at once.”

(In response to an American Women’s League who protested against Einstein’s visit to their country)

Thomas wrote: "Everyman wrote: "One question: do you see a difference between the prose and poetic sections, is one type doing one thing and the other doing another thing, or do you see them working in unison wit..."

Or like a counterpoint also used in music?

Nemo wrote: Or like a counterpoint also used in music?



Yes! Almost like a fugue, especially when the elements of previous parts are woven into it. That's a great analogy.

Patrice wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Patrice wrote: "Thanks so much Nemo! I didn't know where to look."

I should add that the book titled "The World as I See It" is an abridged version of "Ideas and Opinions".

Just to ..."

Here is the second part of the quote:

"But are they not quite right, these watchful citizenesses? Why should
one open one's doors to a person who devours hard-boiled capitalists with as
much appetite and gusto as the Cretan Minotaur in days gone by devoured
luscious Greek maidens, and on top of that is low-down enough to reject
every sort of war, except the unavoidable war with one's own wife? Therefore
give heed to your clever and patriotic women-folk and remember that the
Capitol of mighty Rome was once saved by the cackling of its faithful geese."

His personal life was "normal", though certainly not perfect, as none of ours are. But when you read his own words, and the biography, you'd have a much better understanding of his character and personality.

Thomas wrote: "Nemo wrote: Or like a counterpoint also used in music?

Yes! Almost like a fugue, especially when the elements of previous parts are woven into it. That's a great analogy."

Boethius did write some treatises on music as well (unfortunately I couldn't find any copies). It would be interesting to see if he first developed the idea of counterpoint and applied it to his literary works.

Nemo wrote: "Boethius did write some treatises on music as well (unfortunately I couldn't find any copies). It would be interesting to see if he first developed the idea of counterpoint and applied it to his literary works. ."

When I went to St. John's we read some Boethius in the music tutorial, but the Consolation was not on the reading list at the time. I vaguely remember his theories revolved around the mathematics and moral virtues of musical intervals.

Patrice wrote: "If there is one God and that is the beginning and the end of things, and everything good comes from Him, well, that's the way we were brought up. But is that what Plato meant? Or did religion usurp the form of the good and make it it's own? This might be better left to discuss when we read the Republic but I'll never remember it then!
"

Oh, I think you will. The notion of "participation," how particular instances of things participate in the ideal, is a confounding problem in Plato. As it is in Boethius as well, I think. People are happy and divine by participation in the Perfect Good. But how people come to be imperfect in the first place hasn't been explained.

The natural world did not take its origin from that which was impaired and incomplete, but issues from that which unimpaired and perfect and then degenerates into this fallen and worn out condition.

The question is how does that which is perfect and complete generate imperfection? This is very much a Platonic problem, I think, because any explanation has to describe the mechanism or the connection between the perfect ideal and particular imperfect instances. How does the transcendental affect the everyday world? Why does the natural world "degenerate," as Boethius puts it?

Everyman wrote (@7)"One question: Do you see a difference between the prose and poetic sections, is one type doing one thing and the other doing another thing, or do you see them working in unison without any difference of content or kind?


."

I really appreciated Thomas's response at 17. And I looked up the definition of counterpoint, and that seems very apt as well.

There definitely seems to be a connection or relationship between the poetical pieces and the prose passages. I thought, too, that perhaps Boethius used the two forms to recall us as we read to the comparative values of the two.

(I don't know Plato, but I'm aware that he placed importance on forms. Maybe this was a nod by Boethius towards Plato. There is the easily recognized difference of the physical world---simple acceptance that doesn't require much thought: we can viusually "see" that there is a difference between the poetry sections and the prose sections;

and there is the more difficult difference of the world of reason: the prose passages require alot more reading and alot more effort.)

I rather think that might be of importance. Boethius, remember, was initially seen writing down the lines, "the Muses of Poetry at my bedside dictating words to accompany my tears." In a good translation the concepts in the poetry are basically just handed to the reader all wrapped up in pretty words. It would appear, however, that Bothius wasn't finding much solace.

In contrast, reasoning (the prose sections) takes effort. The prose sections took much more effort for me to read. I'd guess it took more effort of Boethius too. Notice how he's constantly asking questions of Philosophy, looking for clarification and understanding. I'd say that almost by definition reasoning requires effort of the readers.

It CAN happen that someone can give you a poem and you can "get it" right away...it can touch you, even if you know that you don't understand it. Even a cheap, nonsensical poem can bring enjoyment. {I remember one of my childhood favorites: "I never saw a purple cow. I never hope to see one. But I can tell you here and now,
I'd rather see than be one."}

But no one can "give" you Philosophy. Especially not Philosophy with a capital "P". You have to work for it. Remember back in Book I? Philosophy's clothes of "the finest thread [quality stuff] woven [effort] with the most delicate skill [acquired over a long period of time with, again, effort]. Later she told me that she had made them with her own hands." {We each of us has to find our own way there, just like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, yes?} So the reasoning of the prose takes considerably more effort...and yet...The Consolation of Philosophy.


'Though the book begins with poetry, once Philosophy wipes "a little of the blinding cloud" from Boethius' eyes, the amount of prose, of philosophy and reason, soon grows exponentially. So by volume, it would seem that reason/Philosophy is meant to be of greater importance than poetry. And yet...there are all those little bits of poetry. And they DO make the read more enjoyable.

Maybe Boethius used the two forms to show symbolically that it's reason, Philosophy, that is a real importance in our lives....but he didn't discard poetry entirely....because we're not creatures of pure reason---we can't be.


I thought as well that the two forms worked together. An individual makes greater physical gains by engaging in intense physical exercise [effort] followed by a relaxing [enjoyable][effortless] massage. It seems reasonable that an individual would make greater intellectual gains by engaging in intense reasoning [effort] followed by a relaxing poem.

I rather like that analogy. Philosophy is even going to have Boethius start out easy and then progress to the more difficult. A bit like doing warm-up exercises before really working out.


Mmm. I was going to make one more point, but I've used up all the words already.

Anyway...thoughts.

Thomas wrote: "Why does the natural world "degenerate," as Boethius puts it? ..."

Does the natural world indeed degenerate?

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Why does the natural world "degenerate," as Boethius puts it? ..."

Does the natural world indeed degenerate?"

Second Law of Thermodynamics.

Laurele wrote: "Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Why does the natural world "degenerate," as Boethius puts it? ..."

Does the natural world indeed degenerate?"

Second Law of Thermodynamics."

According to Aristotle, what is according to nature is good. So the natural world is good since it behaves according to the Laws of nature.

Patrice wrote: "Aristotle also believed that it was natural for slaves to be slaves. How do we decide what is natural? Is curing disease natural?
Is exposing unwanted infants? Is war?
Seems to me that nature ca..."

I was referring to the natural world only, not the human society. To say that the natural world is imperfect begs the question: What standard do we use to judge whether nature is perfect?

You may say that nature is cruel because people become sick and die, but people are also born and grow in beauty and stature. These are all according to the Laws of nature.

Patrice wrote: "If you think of nature as separate from mankind, then I think man has to partner with God to make the world a better place."

Again, what standard do you use to judge whether the natural world is good or not?

If I'm reading Boethius correctly, he is saying that it is as it should be and we should not intervene.

Think of the natural world as the free market. Should the government intervene and disrupt the internal mechanisms of the free market? I thought you're against intervention. :)

It is consolation for suffering that cannot be avoided. But it doesn't encourage us to do away with suffering.

Do you want to do away with suffering even if it is the only way to restore you to health?

Patrice wrote: "But when Plato was taken into religion, it became top down. The reality of the world came from the idea, rather than the idea coming from the reality. And that's where the difficulty comes in explaining how the world is so imperfect when it came from the perfect idea. Does this make sense? It's the way I make sense of it but I could be missing a lot.

"

Plato's cosmological theory is in a dialogue called Timaeus. If I remember correctly, the cosmos exists in his model as unordered substance until the demiurge comes along and creates the world by giving the four elements (fire, air, earth and water) order. The physical world is one of change, and time, and generation and degeneration, so it is never in perfect conformity with the eternal world of ideas and reason. For this reason Plato says his account is merely a "likely story." The dialogue is complicated and strange, as ancient science tends to be.

The import for Boethius is that the physical world is in some sense a model of the world of ideas and reason, but it has fallen out of order somehow. (I still don't see how or why -- original sin, or entropy, is as good a reason as any, I suppose.) But by the end of Book 3 it sounds like happiness and goodness are tied up with recovering that order and putting it back into a unified whole. "All things seek the good," Philosophy says, which means unity, changeless being, and ultimately God. But this is the philosophical God, the perfect prime mover. I don't see that it must contradict religion in any way (though religion may disagree with Philosophy's model). It seems too abstract to be disagreeable.

Things may change a bit in Book IV, which we can't talk about yet. Take a deep breath and count to ten, Patrice. :)

Patrice wrote: "I'm wondering what Boethius would think of Prozac? lol
"

Ha! Good question. Who needs philosophy when there are psych meds?

Nemo wrote: "Patrice wrote: "If you think of nature as separate from mankind, then I think man has to partner with God to make the world a better place."

Again, what standard do you use to judge whether the natural world is good or not?

Philosophy defines the good as that which all things desire. It is what motivates us; if we want it, we see it as the good, even if we are sometimes mistaken about the truth of its goodness. Philosophy maintains through the practice of reason we can determine what the true good really is. It's probably not Prozac.

Patrice wrote: " if God is love and goodness, wouldn't that set some kind of standard? Didn't Genesis say that man should subdue and tend the garden? ..."

Yes, and it is also said in Genesis that God created the natural world, "And God saw that it was good".

The advances in science and technology are in accord with the laws of nature, not against it. Man has solidified his position by learning the laws of nature and using it to his own advantage (against other inhabitants of the earth, e.g., viruses, bacteria), but nature remains the same, neither better nor worse.

As for government intervention in business, I don't think that's such a great analogy.
First, I am not against certain interventions. The FDA, for instance.

The analogy is appropriate in the sense that human intervention is good when it is based on knowledge, but, when it is based on ideology or motivated by greed and ambition, it is bad.

And my grandparents all immigrated from Russia, so it's in my blood.

Were they Russian Orthodox? Did you read W&P in Russian?

(P.S. We had a long discussion about suffering a while back in the Kierkegaard thread in the Reader's Review group. So I won't repeat it here. The Boethius discussions remind me quite a bit of Kierkegaard.)

Thomas wrote: "Philosophy defines the good as that which all things desire. It is what motivates us; if we want it, we see it as the good,..."

Boethius does seem to reconcile Aristotelian and Platonic ideas nicely, although Aristotle himself tried hard to refute Plato at every turn. :)

The question is: Can we desire something that we don't know?

Nemo wrote: "The question is: Can we desire something that we don't know? "

Sure. You just have to be careful what you ask for. ;)

But seriously, aren't we doing that right now by reading this book? Isn't that what all intellectual inquiry is about, desiring to know what we don't know?

Maybe a corollary to your question is this then: Why do we desire to know what we don't know?

Thomas wrote: "Isn't that what all intellectual inquiry is about, desiring to know what we don't know? ..."

We know something about knowledge in general and through experience we also find it desirable. It's like when people work hard to accumulate possessions. It's not because they desire all the things they don't yet possess or know, but because they desire the feeling of enrichment. If he truly desires the thing for itself, he wold not exchange it for other things, no matter how much more valuable they are. Similarly, if we truly desire some specific knowledge, we would not turn our attention to other subjects, until we've learned all there is to know about this specific subject.

Come to think of it, in the Genesis story, Eve finds the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil "desirable" only after the serpent told her that it would make them "like God". So it seems that desire comes after a certain, though false, knowledge of the thing itself.

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "Isn't that what all intellectual inquiry is about, desiring to know what we don't know? ..."

We know something about knowledge in general and through experience we also find it desi..."

I think what Philosophy is arguing is that there is an ultimate good; using your possessions analogy, there is one Ultimate Possession that no one would ever trade: the Perfect Good. Acquiring particular possessions and trading up for better ones is part of the pursuit for the Ultimate Possession. I think the feeling of enrichment is a by-product of this, the feeling that we are getting closer to this Ultimate.

Eve finds the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil "desirable" only after the serpent told her that it would make them "like God". So it seems that desire comes after a certain, though false, knowledge of the thing itself.

Now I really want to mention something in Book IV, but I will take a deep breath and count to ten and wait another day or two.

Thomas wrote: "I think what Philosophy is arguing is that there is an ultimate good; ..."

Yes, I agree. The question I was asking is whether and how we know/recognize the Ultimate Good. To use the trade analogy again, can we recognize a real Picasso when we see it, or will we dismiss it as child's play and sell it short?

Now I really want to mention something in Book IV, but I will take a deep breath and count to ten and wait another day or two.

Ah, there is another reason why we desire something we don't know: expectation. When you're just starting a book, you expect something from it; but when you've finished it, the actuality sinks in.:)

Thomas wrote: "I think what Philosophy is arguing is that there is an ultimate good; using your possessions analogy, there is one Ultimate Possession that no one would ever trade: the Perfect Good. Acquiring particular possessions and trading up for better ones is part of the pursuit for the Ultimate Possession. I think the feeling of enrichment is a by-product of this, the feeling that we are getting closer to this Ultimate."

The Pearl of Great Price? When he finds it in a field, the man sells all he has to purchase the field.

Nemo wrote: "The question I was asking is whether and how we know/recognize the Ultimate Good. To use the trade analogy again, can we recognize a real Picasso when we see it, or will we dismiss it as child's play and sell it short? "

Have you read Plato's Meno? I don't think Plato's notion of "recollection" is entirely satisfactory, but Meno is a marvelous examination of this very problem.

On a practical level, unless the the painting is signed, there is no distinguishing a Picasso from a very good fake. But Philosophy makes an argument that is close to what today we might call "intelligent design." (Aquinas makes a similar argument.) The upshot is that the world is signed very much like a painting, and that artist is God.

Now we just need an expert to authenticate the signature. :)

Laurele wrote: "The Pearl of Great Price? When he finds it in a field, the man sells all he has to purchase the field.
"

Yes, I think so. I'm starting to wonder if the Consolation shouldn't be read as a similar kind of parable.

Thomas wrote: "I don't think Plato's notion of "recollection" is entirely satisfactory."

Why not?

"But Philosophy makes an argument that is close to what today we might call "intelligent design."

ID, or teleogy, can be traced back to Plato too. Timaeus may have been his thought experiment in designing the universe from the ground up. I find it interesting that he regards regularity in motion and activity as signs of intelligence (the stars are demigods). I can't help wonder, how else would we prove our own intelligent existence to alien species in space?

How could an artist sign his painting so that others can tell that it's not the work of a performing monkey?

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "I don't think Plato's notion of "recollection" is entirely satisfactory."

Why not?

Because the theory of recollection serves as an epistemological ground condition, and like all ground conditions it has to be taken as a matter of convention or faith. I think Boethius runs into the same difficulty, which you've touched on a number of times -- how can we recognize the perfect good when we see it? How do we know what it is if we don't know what it is...

On the other hand, I'm not entirely sure that Boethius requires us to recognize the perfect good. He skirts this issue by suggesting that it is our nature to go to the good whether we recognize it or not.

"How could an artist sign his painting so that others can tell that it's not the work of a performing monkey?

.."

Exactly. Assuming the monkey performs at a very high level, it can't be done. In my opinion, this is why ID is not convincing.

Patrice wrote: "Didn't Aristotle say "all men want to know"?
It's part of our make-up. But Boethius would say that we all want to be happy and that means we all need to know what the good is since good=happy.

."

yes, Aristotle. I thought of that too. But does Boethius say that we have to know the good before we can desire it? I'm thinking at this point that he's with Aristotle on this point -- the good is our telos, it's our goal, and we gravitate toward it like a rock gravitates toward the ground. Boethius adds a step though, making unity the goal, and then equating unity with the good.

Thomas wrote: "He skirts this issue by suggesting that it is our nature to go to the good whether we recognize it or not...."

It that were the case, the world wouldn't have degenerated, would it?

Nemo wrote: "Thomas wrote: "He skirts this issue by suggesting that it is our nature to go to the good whether we recognize it or not...."

It that were the case, the world wouldn't have degenerated, would it?"

Well, if the world started as an unordered chaos of the four elements and has been set on a path to order by desire for the good, then no. (If I understand your question, and Boethius' cosmology correctly.) In that case the world has been on a steady course toward unity and greater order since the prime mover first got the ball rolling.

I don't think Philosophy thinks the world does degenerate, now that I think about it. The natural world does, of course, but the eternal world of ideas does not. Boethius' distress is largely a result of his inability to see that the eternal world is the "real" one, and Philosophy's treatment of B. is one of re-orientation toward the eternal.

Patrice wrote: "We need to understand and recognize the differences between good and bad. Socrates said that it's only error that leads us to the bad. Christians would call "error" "sin"."

This is what I think is the difference between Socrates and Christianity.

Socrates believed that ignorance was the cause of evil. Although man desires good, he is ignorant of the good and therefore commits evil and injustice involuntarily; Christianity, OTOH, teaches that the Goodness of God is manifested in His creation and in His dealing with man. Man is always presented with a choice between good and evil. Sin is deliberate rejection of the Good, i.e., rejection of God.

"signatures can and are forged. The essence of the Picasso cannot be. To know Picassos we have to study Picassos and all other paintings. ..."

It's hard work to truly "know". That's why I don't agree that "all men want to know", because not all are willing to work that hard.

Thomas wrote: "Because the theory of recollection serves as an epistemological ground condition, and like all ground conditions it has to be taken as a matter of convention or faith...."

I see what you mean. Are there alternative theories that you find more satisfactory?

Patrice wrote: "I wonder, do you think that was Aristotle opposing Plato? ..."

I voiced my opinion on that in my review of Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle made me realize just how partisan I could be.:)

Nemo wrote: "I see what you mean. Are there alternative theories that you find more satisfactory?
"

Not really. I think the way we understand the world is way too subtle and complex to be expressed in a theory. But maybe that just means that I haven't heard the right theory yet ;)

So... what's your theory?

Thomas wrote: "Nemo wrote: "I see what you mean. Are there alternative theories that you find more satisfactory?
"

Not really. I think the way we understand the world is way too subtle and complex to be expresse..."

When one says that something is unsatisfactory he implies something else that is satisfactory in comparison. So I was just curious what you had in mind. I learn by example. :)

Adelle wrote: "There definitely seems to be a connection or relationship between the poetical pieces and the prose passages. I thought, too, that perhaps Boethius used the two forms to recall us as we read to the comparative values of the two. "

One interesting thing: in Book 1, the poems come first and then the prose. In the later books it's the other way around. I read in one commentary that this is because in the beginning Boethius is looking to poetry for his consolation, but as he progresses he places philosophy ahead of poetry.

Don't know whether this is what he was actually doing, but it sounds good to me.

Fantastic discussion. I'm just really ticked that my eye is getting worse, and I'm having trouble reading much of anything except very slowly with a magnifying glass. But I go down next week I hope to get it fixed. Meanwhile, I'm following the discussion eagerly and hope at some point to be able to join it intelligently.

Everyman wrote: "Fantastic discussion. I'm just really ticked that my eye is getting worse, and I'm having trouble reading much of anything except very slowly with a magnifying glass. But I go down next week I ho..."

That's really scary, Eman. I hope Philosophy has given you some consolation.